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1  Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate two prominent features of the South 
African law of unjustified enrichment. The first is the general requirement 
that the plaintiff must be impoverished.1 This essentially means that the 
plaintiff’s estate must actually decrease, or would actually have increased had 
it not been for the event giving rise to the defendant’s enrichment.2 The 
second feature is the test for measuring the quantum of enrichment liability, 
namely the lesser of the plaintiff’s impoverishment and the defendant’s 
enrichment, determined at the moment the action is instituted3 (the “double 
ceiling”4 or “double cap”5 rule).
Before proceeding further, it is worth mentioning that a remarkable 
divergence exists among legal systems as to the degree of prominence 
which is accorded to impoverishment (or loss - a term sometimes used as 
functional equivalent) when imposing liability on the basis of unjustified 
enrichment.6 Thus, in the civil-law context, German law does not generally 
* This article is based on a paper presented at a colloquium on the development of the South African law of 
unjustified enrichment held on 27 October 2007 at the Faculty of Law of the University of Stellenbosch  
The financial support of the National Research Foundation (NRF) for this colloquium and the work 
on which this research is based is gratefully acknowledged  Any opinion, findings and conclusions 
or recommendations expressed in this article are those of the author  I further would like to thank the 
participants in the colloquium and Reinhard Zimmermann for their valuable comments
1 See eg Firstrand Bank Ltd v Nedbank (Swaziland) Ltd 2004 6 SA 317 (SCA) para 8 (per Scott JA):
   “The basic ingredients of any enrichment action include the enrichment of one party (the defendant) 
and a corresponding impoverishment of another (the plaintiff). In the absence of an impoverishment 
there can be no right of action”.
 See further Lotz “Enrichment” in LAWSA 9 rev Brand (1996) para 209(b); Visser Unjustified Enrichment 
(2008) 159; Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment in South African Law (2008) 42-43; Eiselen & Pienaar 
Unjustified Enrichment – A Casebook 3 ed (2008) 25
2 See Lotz/Brand LAWSA 9 para 209(b); De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 3 
ed (1987) 339  A decrease in the estate can either result from a decrease in assets or increase in liabilities  
Likewise, an estate would otherwise have increased if there would have been an increase in assets or a 
decrease in liabilities
3 See eg Kudu Granite Operations (Pty) Ltd v Caterna Ltd 2003 5 SA 193 (SCA) para 17; Mndi v Malgas 
2006 2 SA 182 (E) para 25; Goudini Chrome (Pty) Ltd v MCC Contracts (Pty) Ltd 1993 1 SA 77 (A) 
84J-85A, Visser Unjustified Enrichment 161-164
4 See Linssen “Remedies for Wrongdoing – The Measure of Recovery” 2006 14(3) ERPL 351 357; in French 
law reference is made to the double plafond
5 Visser Unjustified Enrichment 115, 161, 266, 730
6 For comparative overviews see Beatson & Schrage Cases, Materials and Texts on Unjustified Enrichment 
(2003) ch 4; Schlechtriem Restitution und Bereicherungsausgleich in Europa 1 (2000) 231-237
       
require impoverishment,7 whereas Dutch law does,8 and also recognises the 
“double ceiling” rule.9 In the common-law context, it has not been resolved 
in English law whether a claim for restitution based on unjust enrichment of 
the defendant requires proof of loss on the side of the plaintiff. It is recognised 
that the enrichment has to be at the plaintiff’s expense, but it is not settled that 
this means that the plaintiff had to suffer a loss or had to be impoverished.10 
Canadian law however, requires that a claim based on unjust enrichment 
should be mirrored by a loss,11 and also follows the “double ceiling” rule.12 
Finally, divergence also characterises systems that contain a mixture of civil 
law and common law. It has been said that in Scots law “loss on the part 
of the pursuer does not appear within the term ‘unjustified enrichment’ as 
a definitional necessity of the claim at the same level as ‘enrichment’, but a 
requirement of loss is nevertheless often stated”.13 The position in Louisiana, 
in turn, closely resembles that of South Africa: its Civil Code unequivocally 
requires loss and also recognises the “double ceiling” rule.14
Against the background of this brief comparative overview, which simply 
serves to dispel the notions that the plaintiff’s impoverishment is a universal 
requirement for imposing liability on the basis of unjustified enrichment, and 
that the measure of such liability is universally regarded as the lesser of the 
plaintiff’s impoverishment and the defendant’s enrichment, the justifications 
for these notions will now be examined more closely. This will be followed by 
an evaluation of their application in certain fact patterns involving unjustified 
enrichment.
2  Justifications for requiring impoverishment
It is not easy to answer the question why South African law traditionally 
requires that the plaintiff must be impoverished for purposes of imposing 
enrichment liability, since the requirement is often stated in a way which gives 
7 See eg Wieling Bereicherungsrecht 3 ed (2004) 1-2; Zimmermann “Unjustified Enrichment: The 
Modern Civilian Approach” 1995 OJLS 403; for contrary views see Jansen “Die Korrektur grundloser 
Vermögensverschiebungen als Restitution” 2003 ZSS (RA) 106 132 sqq  The first draft of the German 
Civil Code still required that the enrichment had to come from the estate (aus dem Vermögen) of the 
plaintiff (see para 748)  However, the final version of the German Civil Code simply requires that the 
enrichment had to be “at the expense of” the plaintiff (para 812 BGB)
8 See Art 6:212 BW (“he who is unjustifiably enriched at the expense of another is obliged, to the extent that 
it is reasonable, to compensate his [ie the other person’s] loss up to the amount of his enrichment”); further 
see Linssen 2006 ERPL 356 and the extracts in Beatson & Schrage Unjustified Enrichment 192-203  The 
duty to return performances that are not owed is specifically regulated in Arts 6:203–6:211 BW
9 See Art 6:212 BW
10 Birks Unjust Enrichment 2 ed (2005) 79 denied the implication of a loss; also see Sempra Metals Ltd 
(formerly Metallgesellschaft Ltd v Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2007] UKHL 34 
para 31, but contrast eg McInnes “Interceptive Subtraction, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongs – A Reply 
to Professor Birks” 2003 CLJ 697; Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1991] 1 AC 221 
237
11 Cf Air Canada v British Columbia (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 161 194 (SCC); also see Pettkus v Becker [1980] 2 
SCR 217 227
12 See McInnes “The Canadian Principle of Unjust Enrichment: Comparative Insights into the Law of 
Restitution” 1999 Alberta LR 1 20
13 Evans-Jones Unjustified Enrichment – Enrichment by Deliberate Conferral: Condictio (2004) para 7 35
14 Art 2298
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the impression that it is self-evident. Nonetheless, closer inspection reveals 
that at least the following justifications could underlie its acceptance.
2 1  The justification of promoting corrective justice: (only) enrichment 
which can be related to another’s impoverishment has to be 
balanced out
Two ideas which originated in classical Roman law and ancient Greek 
philosophy are central to the impoverishment requirement. Although these 
ideas are closely related to each other, this relationship was not appreciated 
at first.
The first idea is encapsulated in the famous saying of the Roman jurist 
Sextus Pomponius that “it is by nature fair that nobody be enriched to the 
detriment of another”.15 Note that Pomponius does not have a problem with 
persons being enriched in general. His objection is only directed to those cases 
of enrichment that can be related to some form of detriment befalling another. 
Unfortunately, the principle is formulated so vaguely that it is of limited use. 
Pomponius does not explain why detriment is so important, or what exactly it 
means. The mere fact that one person is enriched to the detriment of another 
cannot automatically be regarded as unfair. Otherwise a person would not be 
able to retain the enrichment flowing from a valid contract which results in 
a loss to another. To be of any use, Pomponius’s general principle requires 
further amplification or qualification.
This brings us to the second idea, which was developed by Aristotle and 
remains of fundamental importance in private law to this day. It is the familiar 
notion of corrective justice. In an analysis of various types of justice, Aristotle 
pointed out that there is a need to “straighten out” or correct the consequences 
of certain “interactions” or “transactions” between individuals, irrespective 
of their personal merit.16 Thus, when one person wrongly causes harm to 
another, the judge can equalize or correct matters by imposing a penalty. For 
the interaction to call for correction, the parties therefore have to be linked 
in a specific way: for example, the one has to do wrong and the other has to 
suffer harm.
Aristotle concerned him more with the interactions which we would now call 
contracts and delicts, and not with those covered by Pomponius’s enrichment 
principle, which we nowadays regard as the domain of the law of unjustified 
enrichment. To appreciate the link between corrective justice and enrichment 
liability we have to turn the clock forward. Some Roman lawyers and 
medieval theologians and philosophers came to appreciate that there is a need 
to redress the imbalance created when a person gains from taking something 
15 D 12 6 14, Pomp 21 ad Sabinum (“Nam hoc natura aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento fieri 
locupletiorem”); another formulation is contained in D 50 17 206, Pomp 9 ex variis lectionibus (“Iure 
naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et iniuria fieri locupletiorem”)  For discussions see 
Zimmermann The Law of Obligations (1989) 851-854; Dawson Unjust Enrichment (1951) 1-8
16 Nicomachean Ethics V  ii, iv
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from another by imposing a duty of restitution.17 However, they did not fully 
comprehend that unjustified enrichment could be the source of such a duty, 
and hence a source of obligations distinct from contract and delict. The first 
person to do so was the seventeenth-century Roman-Dutch jurist De Groot.18 
It is by examining his views that the link between enrichment as a source of 
obligation and corrective justice, and the relevance of impoverishment in this 
context, becomes clearer.
According to De Groot, the law should in certain situations impose an 
obligation to balance out an imbalance (onevenheid).19 Such an imbalance 
not only arises from situations which we would nowadays regard as involving 
delicts, but also in cases of enrichment where someone without legal title 
derives, or may derive, a benefit from another’s property20 - for example 
where one person enriches another through preserving or improving their 
property.21
De Groot’s analysis is significant for a number of reasons. First, unlike 
Pomponius, he does not generally appeal to fairness to justify imposing an 
obligation. De Groot specifically refers to the need to correct or balance out 
an imbalance. Via the earlier theological works, most notably those of Thomas 
Aquinas,22 this view can ultimately be linked to the Aristotelian concept of 
corrective justice. Thus, corrective justice-based thinking essentially provided 
the cornerstone when De Groot laid the foundations of unjustified enrichment 
as a distinct source of liability. To this day, this idea is of central importance 
and enjoys widespread support in both civil-law and common-law quarters.23
Secondly, and crucially for present purposes, De Groot relies on Pomponius 
in stating that for an enrichment to give rise to an imbalance there had to be 
17 See eg Cicero De Officiis 3 5 21; Aquinas Summa Theologica II  ii  question 62 art 1 on whether 
restitution is an act of commutative (ie corrective) justice; Hallebeek The Concept of Unjust Enrichment 
in Late Scholasticism (1996) 12; Dolezalek “The Moral Theologians’ Doctrine of Restitution and Its 
Juridification in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries” 1992 AJ 104 106
18 See especially Feenstra “Grotius’ Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment as a Source of Obligation: Its Origin and 
Its Influence in Roman-Dutch Law” in Schrage (ed) Unjust Enrichment - The Comparative Legal History 
of the Law of Restitution 2 ed (1999) 197 199-200  Further see Visser Unjustified Enrichment 17-19
19 See De Groot Inl 3 1 9, 3 1 14-3 1 18; De Groot De Jure Belli ac Pacis 2 10 2 1  
20 De Groot Inl 3 30 1 (“Verbintenisse door baet-trecking ontstaet, wanneer iemand zonder voorige recht-
gunninghe baet treckt, ofte zoude komen te trecken, uit eens anders goed”), read with De Groot Inl 3 1 
15
21 De Groot Inl 3 1 15; see Feenstra “Grotius’ Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment” in Unjust Enrichment 204
22 Summa Theologica II  ii  question 62  Aquinas pointed out that an imbalance or unevenness could be 
restored through an act of restitution  Restitution could be regarded as an act of commutative justice or 
corrective justice as Aristotle called it (see Hallebeek The Concept of Unjust Enrichment 12, 88; further 
see Feenstra “Grotius’ Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment” in Unjust Enrichment 202, 210 sqq; Birks & 
McLeod “The Implied Contract Theory of Quasi-contract: Civilian Opinion Current in the Century 
before Blackstone” 1986 OJLS 46 59-63; Jansen 2003 ZSS (RA) 132 sqq)
23 See, in the civil law context, Von Caemmerer “Bereicherung und unerlaubte Handlung” in Dölle, 
Rheinstein & Zweigert (eds) Festschrift für Ernst Rabel (1954) 335 337; Zimmermann 1995 OJLS 403, 
and, in the common-law context, Weinrib The Idea of Private Law (1995) especially 140 sqq; Weinrib 
“Restoring Restitution” 2005 (91) Virginia LR 861; Smith “Restitution: The Heart of Corrective Justice” 
2001 Texas LR 2115; Burrows “Contract, Tort and Restitution – A Satisfactory Division or Not?” 1983 
LQR 217; Barker “Unjust Enrichment: Containing the Beast” 1995 OJLS 457; Posner “The Concept 
of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law” 1981 Journal of Legal Studies 187; Regional 
Municipality of Peel v Canada [1992] 3 SCR 762 804
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a concomitant loss or detriment (schade) on the side of the claimant.24 This 
detriment is manifest in cases where there is enrichment arising from a loss 
of ownership without legal ground. In that context it is essential for claiming 
restitution that there has to be a loss of ownership, for if there were no such a 
loss, there would be no enrichment on the side of the defendant. The plaintiff 
would remain owner and could simply reclaim possession of the object with 
a vindicatory action. Or, to put it in corrective justice terms, there can be no 
duty to provide restitution arising from an imbalance, because there is no 
imbalance if the plaintiff remains owner.
The difficulty with this analysis, though, is that is restricted to simple two-
party situations involving enrichment by way of acquisition of ownership. For 
example, if I am only obliged to deliver you one horse, but I mistakenly deliver 
two, thereby making you owner of both, I am automatically impoverished 
by delivery of the second horse. This loss can then be balanced out by an 
enrichment claim. But not all forms of enrichment can be related so directly 
and inevitably to another’s loss. For example, you can be enriched through 
unauthorised use of my horse, but without me suffering an actual loss.25 
Given that this amounts to a direct infringement on my right as owner to 
possess and use my property, it can be asked why this is not also a situation 
where there is an imbalance, and where corrective justice will not be better 
served by requiring that you must account for your enrichment. These are not 
questions which concerned De Groot, but if South African lawyers want to 
rely on corrective justice-based justifications for requiring impoverishment on 
the side of the plaintiff, they cannot be left unanswered. This will be done later 
on.26 For now, a second, closely-related justification for the impoverishment 
requirement has to be considered.
2 2  The justification that proof of impoverishment is essential to 
determine that the enrichment was at the expense of the plaintiff
It is a general requirement of the South African law of unjustified enrichment 
that the plaintiff must have been enriched at the expense of the plaintiff. This 
requirement is traditionally stated separately from the requirement that the 
plaintiff has to be impoverished.27 However, the case law regards the two 
as closely linked: in fact, there are suggestions that the plaintiff must prove 
that he was impoverished in order to establish that the enrichment was at his 
expense. Thus, in Fletcher and Fletcher v Bulawayo Waterworks Co Ltd,28 
Chief Justice Innes stated that
24 De Groot Inl 3 30 3 (“Deze verbintenisse is het aengeboren recht de naeste: want de billykheyt laet niet 
toe na de scheydinge der eygendommen, dat yemand hem zal verryken over eens anders schade”)  The 
references to Pomp D 12 6 14 and D 50 17 206 are in De Groot Inl 3 30 3 n 3
25 To use the famous example of Lord Mansfield in Hambly v Trott (1776) 1 Cowp 371, 98 ER 1136
26 See 5 below
27 See eg McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC 2001 3 SA 482 (SCA) paras 15, 19-20 per Schutz 
JA and para 2 per Harms JA; Kudu Granite Operations (Pty) Ltd v Caterna Ltd 2003 5 SA 193 (SCA) para 
17; Laco Parts (Pty) Ltd t/a ACA Clutch v Turners Shipping (Pty) Ltd 2008 1 SA 279 (W) para 22; Watson 
NO v Shaw NO 2008 1 SA 350 (C) para 11; further see generally Visser Unjustified Enrichment 156-192; 
Eiselen & Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 27; Lotz/Brand LAWSA 9 para 76(d)
28 1915 AD 636
498 STELL LR 2009 3
       
“The equitable principle on which the law awards compensation for improvements is that no man 
should be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another. Both elements must concur, benefit 
to the claimant and detriment to the improver, and both must be borne in mind in assessing the 
amount.”29
Although statements like these are also found in some foreign 
jurisdictions,30 others do not regard it as self-evident that it is only possible 
to prove that enrichment was at the expense of another if that person was 
actually impoverished.31 To understand the latter approach it is necessary 
to consider the rationale of the “at the expense of” requirement. In essence, 
it serves to link a specific person (the plaintiff) causally to the enrichment 
of another (the defendant).32 Once it is accepted that the “at the expense of” 
requirement essentially deals with causality, and with providing locus standi 
to a particular plaintiff, it is easier to understand why some accept that the 
violation of any protectable interest assigned to a plaintiff, and not only the 
violation of an interest which is manifested in actual impoverishment, could 
sufficiently link a specific plaintiff to the defendant’s enrichment. Proof that 
the plaintiff was impoverished could of course assist in finding that enrichment 
was at the expense of the claimant, but such proof need not be a requirement 
for imposing liability.
Although we have come a long way from the brief discussion of Pomponius’s 
famous enrichment principle, it is perhaps not inappropriate to conclude by 
pointing out an interesting aspect of the way in which it is translated which 
illustrates the point made above. It will be recalled that Pomponius maintained 
that it is fair that nobody should be enriched cum alterius detrimento.33 I have 
translated the Latin words rather literally as “to the detriment of another”. 
However, this phrase is often translated in two other ways. The first is as 
“to the loss of another” or “through another’s loss”.34 Such a translation 
suggests that the plaintiff must indeed suffer harm for enrichment liability to 
be imposed. However, cum alterius detrimento is sometimes translated more 
figuratively, namely as “at the expense of another”.35 In this translation the 
implication of actual loss is less strong: what matters is that you did not gather 
the gain purely on your own, and that someone else had to be affected by it in 
a negative manner, without necessarily being impoverished.
29 649; approved by Ogilvie Thompson JA in Nortje v Pool NO 1966 3 SA 96 (A) 104
30 In the context of English law, see Burrows, McKendrick & Edelman Cases and Materials on the Law 
of Restitution 2 ed (2007) 109 (“In relation to restitution of an unjust enrichment, ‘at the claimant’s 
expense’ means by subtraction from the claimant’s wealth  For example, if the claimant mistakenly pays 
the defendant £100, the defendant’s gain of £100 represents a subtraction from the claimant’s wealth 
of £100”)  But see Birks Unjust Enrichment 73-74, where it is said that enrichment “at the expense of 
another” is enrichment which is “drawn from another”, and that that “from” does not necessarily imply 
“loss”  On Dutch law, see the extracts in Beatson & Schrage Unjustified Enrichment 196-197 which 
reflect that enrichment “at the expense of another” requires impoverishment
31 See Wieling Bereicherungsrecht 2
32 See eg First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v East Coast Design CC 2000 4 SA 137 (D) 141; St 
Helena Primary School v MEC, Department of Education, Free State Province 2007 4 SA 16 (O) para 
25
33 D 12 6 14
34 Birks An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1985) 23; Dawson Unjust Enrichment 1-8
35 See Zimmermann Obligations 852, Johnston & Zimmermann “Unjustified Enrichment: Surveying the 
Landscape” in Johnston & Zimmermann (eds) Unjustified Enrichment – Key Issues in Comparative 
Perspective (2002) 3
THE RELEVANCE OF THE PLAINTIFF’S IMPOVERISHMENT 499
       
3  Justifications for the rule that the measure of liability is the 
lesser of the plaintiff’s impoverishment and the defendant’s 
enrichment (the “double ceiling” rule)
The focus now shifts from the impoverishment requirement to the “double 
ceiling” rule. Again two, related justifications can be discerned.
3 1  The justification based on the notion that the enrichment claim 
“replaces” a lost proprietary (ie vindicatory) claim
The first justification draws inspiration from the notion that an enrichment 
claim is essentially awarded to compensate or make good the loss of the right 
of ownership. It will be recalled that De Groot essentially based enrichment 
liability on the need to redress an imbalance (onevenheid) which arises 
through becoming owner of another’s property.36 Although De Groot did 
not expressly formulate a “double ceiling” rule, his ideas have influenced the 
famous Dutch jurist Bregstein in formulating such a rule. In a passage which 
apparently found favour with Rumpff JA in Nortje v Pool NO,37 Bregstein 
considered these views of De Groot and then stated that
“it follows that with this action [ie the personal enrichment action] … one can never claim more than 
the value which was lost by the impoverished party or … the value remaining with the defendant at 
the time of the action.”38
Bregstein then proceeds to provide the following rather complex justification 
for the “double ceiling” rule. According to him, enrichment liability and 
delictual liability are closely related: in fact, he goes as far as regarding it as 
the primary aim of an enrichment action to make good a loss or to redress 
impoverishment.39 The purpose of the “double ceiling” rule is then to cap the 
quantum of this claim for making good the loss if the value remaining is less 
than the value lost:
“[T]he value can only be reclaimed to the extent that it still remains, just as it is only the object which 
can be reclaimed with the rei vindicatio inasmuch as it is still in existence”.40
Bregstein’s argument is not unassailable. If making good a loss is the 
primary aim of imposing enrichment liability, why should the person who 
suffered loss of ownership be made to bear the risk of devaluation of the 
object? De Groot, from whom Bregstein derived inspiration, said nothing of 
the sort. De Groot’s focus throughout is on correcting an imbalance due to 
benefitting or enrichment, and not on compensating losses.
Bregstein’s justification for the “double ceiling” rule also suffers from a 
further limitation. It is restricted to those cases of enrichment which arise 
36 See De Groot Inl 3 30 3 (“de billykheyt laet niet toe na de scheydinge der eygendommen, dat yemand hem 
zal verryken over eens anders schade”)
37 1966 3 SA 96 (A) 115
38 Ongegronde Vermogensvermeerdering (1927) 192 (own translation)  
39 “The enrichment action is therefore quite similar to a claim for damages: it is primarily aimed at making 
good a proprietary loss, and it is only limited in one respect, namely the requirement that there has to 
be a still extant corresponding increase in the estate against which the claim is directed” (197; own 
translation)
40 194 (own translation)
500 STELL LR 2009 3
       
from the transfer of ownership. It does not provide any justification for other 
cases of enrichment, such as those resulting from the rendering of services, 
improving another’s property without any loss of ownership, or from use of 
another’s assets. In these circumstances the analogy with the proprietary or 
vindicatory claim, which is restricted to what remains of the object claimed 
by the owner, cannot apply. This does not mean that the “double ceiling” rule 
could not be applied in these cases. But then other justifications are called 
for.
3 2  The justification that the “double ceiling” rule is a logical 
consequence of the “at the expense of” requirement
The second justification for the “double ceiling” rule is formulated as 
follows in Lotz and Brand’s exposition of the impoverishment requirement in 
LAWSA.41 After stating that the quantum of the plaintiff’s claim is the amount 
by which the plaintiff has been impoverished or by which the defendant has 
been enriched, whichever is the lesser, the accompanying footnote declares 
that:
“This follows from the next requirement, ie that the defendant’s enrichment must be at the plaintiff’s 
expense. See Fletcher & Fletcher v Bulawayo Waterworks Co Ltd, Bulawayo Waterworks Co Ltd v 
Fletcher & Fletcher 1915 AD 636 649”.42
To understand this justification, which also enjoys some support in the 
common law,43 the following examples are helpful.
In the first set of examples, the impoverishment is less than the enrichment. 
This is illustrated by the facts of Nortje v Pool NO.44 There the cost to the 
plaintiffs of prospecting for minerals was less than the increase in the value 
of the farm. Assuming that the minority was correct, and that an enrichment 
claim should have been awarded, the quantum would then have been limited to 
the prospectors’ aggregate costs (ie their actual impoverishment), and would 
not have been the total enrichment of the defendant through the increase in 
the value of the farm.45 Another example is that of the plaintiff who makes an 
undue payment to the defendant, who in turn uses the money to buy a lottery 
ticket and wins the lottery. The plaintiff’s claim can again be restricted to his 
actual impoverishment, and not the value remaining with defendant.
In the second set of examples, the enrichment is less than the impoverishment. 
The typical situation involves expensive improvements to another’s property. 
Illustrative cases include Skyword (Pvt) Ltd v Peter Scales (Pvt) Ltd,46 where 
the plaintiff could not recover the full costs of repairing the defendant’s 
41 LAWSA 9 para 209(b)
42 Para 209 n 14  The particular passage from the Fletcher case reads as follows:
   “The equitable principle on which the law awards compensation for improvements is that no man 
should be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another. Both elements must concur, benefit 
to the claimant and detriment to the improver, and both must be borne in mind in assessing the 
amount”.
43 Cf McInnes “‘At the Plaintiff’s Expense’: Quantifying Restitutionary Relief” 1998 CLJ 472
44 1966 3 SA 96 (A)
45 108  
46 1979 1 SA 570 (R)
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aeroplane because the defendant could have had it repaired for less; ABSA Bank 
Ltd t/a Bankfin v Stander t/a CAW Paneelkloppers,47 where the garage was 
not allowed the full costs of repairs and services, but only the lesser amount 
of the increased value of the vehicle, and Fletcher & Fletcher v Bulawayo 
Waterworks Co Ltd,48 where a well was sunk on the defendant’s land at a cost 
of £500, but the court limited the claim to the enhancement of the property, ie 
the plaintiff’s actual enrichment, which amounted to only £100.
The relevance of these two sets of examples in the context of justifications 
for the “double ceiling” rule is the following. In the first set of examples, 
applying the rule prevents a person from making a profit from an enrichment 
claim. The increase in the value of the farm beyond the prospector’s costs, 
or winning the lottery is the defendant’s good fortune, and the plaintiff 
has nothing to complain about.49 Such “excess enrichment” is essentially 
regarded as causally irrelevant when claiming against the defendant. Since the 
“at the expense of” requirement is aimed at making the plaintiff only liable for 
causally relevant enrichment, the application of the “double ceiling” rule then 
in effect serves to promote this requirement. In the second set of examples, 
applying the rule in turn prevents the defendant from being liable for more 
than his actual enrichment. The effect of applying the “double ceiling” rule is 
that the plaintiff’s “excess impoverishment” is regarded as causally irrelevant 
when claiming against the defendant. Again, applying the rule in effect serves 
the “at the expense of” requirement.
The overview above reveals that justifications for requiring impoverishment 
of the plaintiff and the “double ceiling” rule largely focus on the relatively 
simple cases of enrichment by way of transfer of ownership of property 
between two parties. The overview further shows that the justifications rely 
heavily on the need to give effect to the requirement that enrichment has to 
be at the expense of plaintiff. In the following sections, the focus will be on 
certain problem cases which assist in evaluating these justifications. These 
cases essentially deal with passing on impoverishment to third parties, and 
with enrichment by “taking” from others through infringing on their rights.
4  Evaluating the relevance of impoverishment in awarding 
enrichment claims: the problem case of disimpoverishment by 
passing on
Passing on occurs when a plaintiff manages to pass his impoverishment on 
to a third party.50 Strict adherence to an impoverishment requirement and 
the “double ceiling” rule requires that an enrichment claim must be denied in 
these circumstances. As La Forest J stated in the Canadian case of Air Canada 
v British Columbia:51
47 1998 1 SA 939 (C) 957  
48 1915 AD 636
49 Whitty & Visser “Unjustified Enrichment” in Zimmermann, Visser & Reid (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in 
Comparative Perspective - Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 399 410  
50 See generally Rush The Defence of Passing On (2006)
51 (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 161 (SCC); see McInnes 1999 Alberta LR 21
502 STELL LR 2009 3
       
“[t]he law of restitution is not intended to confer windfalls to plaintiffs who have suffered no loss. Its 
function is to ensure that where a plaintiff has been deprived of wealth that is either in his possession 
or would have accrued to his benefit, it is restored to him.”52
However, a number of legal systems do not follow this approach.53 In 
the English case of Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Birmingham City Council54 the 
plaintiff claimed restitution of payments made under a void contract. The 
defendant argued that it was not enriched at the claimant’s expense, since the 
claimant had made good its “losses” by hedging transactions with third parties. 
This defence of passing on was rejected. The circumstances under which the 
passing on by way of the hedging contracts occurred were regarded as too 
remote, and irrelevant in determining whether the defendant was enriched 
at the claimant’s expense. Comparable approaches have been followed in 
Australia55 and France.56
Against the backdrop of these divergent approaches it can now be asked how 
South African law deals with passing on, and especially what the implications 
are for its treatment of the impoverishment requirement. In Govender v 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd57 (“Govender”) a bank inadvertently paid out 
a countermanded cheque. It was held that the bank was not impoverished, 
because the bank was entitled to be indemnified by its client. The recipient’s 
enrichment was then said to be at the expense of the client, not the bank.58 
However, the court in Govender was willing to accept that a different result 
would have been reached, had the bank been indemnified by an insurer, and 
not by its own client.59 This approach was confirmed in St Helena Primary 
School v MEC, Department of Education, Free State Province.60 A building 
owned by the Department of Education, but used by St Helena Primary 
School, was damaged. The school had the building repaired, but was partially 
indemnified by its insurer. The school61 then instituted an enrichment claim 
against the Department, essentially on the ground that the Department was 
enriched by being spared the expense of repairing its own building. It was 
52 194
53 Beatson & Schrage Unjustified Enrichment 170, 172; Visser Unjustified Enrichment 748-752
54 [1997] QB 380
55 See Commissioner of State Revenue v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 51 (HCA): “[t]he 
subtraction from the plaintiff’s wealth enables one to say that the defendant’s unjust enrichment has been 
‘at the expense of the plaintiff’ notwithstanding that the plantiff may recoup the outgoing by means of 
transactions with third parties”  
56 See Schlechtriem Restitution und Bereicherungsausgleich 2 (2001) 233 (para 255), referring to a decision 
of the Court of Cassation (10 02 1998, Droit et patrimoine 1998, Nr  2097)  There the operator of a filling 
station made undue payments to his suppliers, but passed the costs of these payments on to his customers  
The owner was allowed to reclaim the undue payments from the suppliers even though he was not 
impoverished
57 1984 4 SA 392 (C)
58 408-409  After B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1995 2 SA 279 (A), the bank’s claim 
would have failed, because there was a valid legal ground for the defendant’s enrichment
59 1984 (4) SA 392 (C) 408E-G
60 2007 4 SA 16 (O), confirmed on appeal in St Helena Primary School v MEC, Department of Education, 
Free State Province [2008] JOL 22616 (O)  The claim ultimately failed, because the enrichment of the 
Department was supported by a legal ground
61 Technically, the insurer instituted the action in the name of the school by relying on subrogation, but 
nothing turns on this aspect of the case
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held that the school was impoverished even though it managed to pass the 
costs of the repairs on to the insurer.62
In the light of these cases, it can be concluded that the South African law of 
unjustified enrichment professes to, but does not uniformly insist on proof of 
impoverishment. The courts do not engage in a simple factual enquiry as to 
whether the plaintiff’s estate has decreased, but are influenced by considerations 
such as the identity of the party who reimbursed the plaintiff (for example, 
whether it was a client or insurer). In effect the courts at times legally deem a 
party to be impoverished when this is in fact not the case. Given the artificiality 
of these determinations, it is suggested that it is preferable to concede the lack 
of impoverishment in the passing on cases, but not to regard it as fatal for an 
enrichment claim. Such an approach does not, however, open the floodgates 
to enrichment claims. The plaintiff still has to meet the requirement that the 
enrichment was at his expense, which provides the courts with a controlling 
function. In terms of this requirement, a plaintiff who managed to recoup 
actual losses still has to establish a sufficiently strong causal connection with 
the defendant’s enrichment to justify awarding a claim. Thus, in Govender, it 
could have been held that the plaintiff bank was not impoverished, but that the 
defendant was still enriched at the plaintiff’s expense, since the reimbursement 
by the insurer was causally irrelevant. Liability could then be imposed despite 
the absence of actual impoverishment. In cases where the causal connection 
is felt to be too weak, the claim could in turn be refused.63
5  Evaluating the relevance of impoverishment in awarding 
enrichment claims: the problem case of enrichment by 
“taking” or infringing on another’s rights
5 1  introduction
Earlier on we alluded to the possibility that justifications which operate in 
the context of loss of ownership situations do not necessarily apply with equal 
force to other contexts. In this section, the focus will be on a category of cases 
which has featured particularly prominently in the comparative literature, 
but which is largely unexplored in South African law.64 This is the category 
of enrichment by infringing on another’s rights, or, as it sometimes is put 
62 Paras 23-24  Because the school repaired the damage out of the proceeds of an insurance policy and not 
from its own funds, the defendant disputed that the plaintiff was impoverished  The defendant contended 
that the res inter alios acta maxim and collateral-source rule (which essentially states that certain forms 
of compensation received from a collateral source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer or his insurer, do 
not operate to reduce the damages recoverable by the victim) did not apply  However, the court accepted 
the plaintiff’s contention that the collateral-source rule applied, and that the source of the funds with 
which the school repaired the damage was irrelevant
63 The determination in St Helena Primary School v MEC, Department of Education, Free State Province 
2007 4 SA 16 (O) that the enrichment was not at the expense of the plaintiff (see para 25) can, however, 
be subjected to criticism – see Sonnekus & Schlemmer “Verrykingsvordering na Herstel van Brandskade 
aan Vreemde Eiendom en Versekerbare Belang” 2007 TSAR 823 830-831
64 Pioneering studies include Blackie & Farlam “Enrichment by the Act of the Party Enriched” in 
Zimmermann, Visser & Reid (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective - Property and 
Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 469; Visser & van Zyl “The Borderline between Delict 
and Enrichment” 2000 AJ 300; Van Zyl “Enrichment and Wrongs in South African Law” 1997 AJ 273
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more simply, by “taking” from another. In contrast to cases covered by the 
condictiones, the enrichment does not result from the plaintiff deliberately 
conferring a benefit on or “giving” to the defendant. And in contrast to the 
various enrichment claims of occupiers and possessors based on improving 
or preserving another’s property, or of persons who pay another’s debt, the 
plaintiff does not “impose” enrichment on the defendant. In fact, it is the other 
way around: it is the defendant who acts by “taking” the enrichment.65
Cases of enrichment by taking may of course also involve a loss of ownership, 
but then it is not the result of giving. For example, a person can be enriched 
by taking another’s property and then changing it in a way which results in 
original acquisition of ownership. The enrichment could also result from 
infringing on some other right of the plaintiff, for example on his right to use 
his property, as opposed to depriving him of ownership. Thus, to return to an 
earlier example, the defendant can be enriched by taking the plaintiff’s horse, 
but then bring it back again, none the worse for wear. In these circumstances, 
the defendant is in all probability enriched by having the use of the horse: he 
was at least saved the expense of hiring another one. But it is much less clear 
that the plaintiff was impoverished, and if not, whether this should be fatal to 
an enrichment claim against the defendant.
The treatment of enrichment by taking is one of the most complex and 
contentious topics in the law of unjustified enrichment. It gives rise to 
fundamental classificatory problems – especially determining the respective 
domains of the law of unjustified enrichment and delict. These difficulties 
are hardly surprising, given the closely related “correcting” or balancing out 
function both areas of law fulfil.66 If one person is enriched by taking from 
another, which area of law should do the balancing out? Should it be the law of 
delict, which balances out the consequences of wrongful behaviour, including 
that of taking, by awarding damages? Or should it be the law of unjustified 
enrichment, which in turn corrects a variety of forms of enrichment without 
legal ground by imposing a duty of restitution? Or, should it even be both? 
The question whether the plaintiff from whom the defendant has taken the 
enrichment must prove that he was either impoverished (in the language of 
enrichment law) or suffered damage or a loss (in the language of the law of 
delict) is central to these debates.
If the law of delict is indeed able to accommodate the fact pattern of 
enrichment by taking, the question arises whether there is any need to consider 
if enrichment law should do so as well. It can be regarded as simply pragmatic 
to avoid the problem altogether in the relatively unexplored field of unjustified 
enrichment, compared to delict, with its more firmly established body of 
principles on wrongful behaviour. Before the justifications in enrichment 
65 The label “enrichment by the act of the party enriched” (see Blackie & Farlam “Enrichment by the Act 
of the Party Enriched” in Mixed Legal Systems 469) is somewhat inapposite in these situations  In some 
cases of enrichment by “taking” (and then the term is already interpreted broadly) the enriched does 
not act at all (for example if a farmer’s sheep break through a fence and graze on the neighbouring farm 
– see Wieling Bereicherungsrecht 46)  Furthermore, the enriched defendant can also “act” in cases of 
enrichment by “giving”, namely by co-operating with the transfer being made to him  
66 See 2 above
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law for requiring impoverishment in the context of enrichment by taking is 
considered, it is therefore imperative first to consider the relevant delictual 
principles.
5 2  delictual claims in cases of enrichment by taking without causing 
loss
South African law distinguishes between three main types of delict, namely 
(i) wrongfully causing patrimonial loss (damnum iniuria datum, which gives 
rise to the Aquilian action), (ii) wrongfully infringing on another’s personality 
rights (iniuria), and (iii) wrongfully inflicting pain and suffering associated 
with bodily injury to the plaintiff.67 The focus here will be on wrongfully 
causing patrimonial loss.
To succeed with the Aquilian action the plaintiff must prove a loss.68 
In determining the measure of liability, the focus is solely on his estate: 
the loss is measured by comparing his current actual patrimonial position 
with the patrimonial position he would have been in had the delict not been 
committed.69 It therefore does not matter whether the defendant may have 
benefitted from the delict, or whether this benefit is greater than plaintiff’s 
actual loss. Thus, if the defendant was enriched through committing fraud, 
theft or depriving another of possession of their property, no attention is paid 
to the position of his estate. If a fraudster used his ill-gotten gains to buy a 
lottery ticket, and won, the plaintiff would only be able to claim the value of 
the lost money, and not be able to lay claim to the profit. And if the defendant 
took the plaintiff’s horse without permission, entered it for a race and won a 
fortune, it would not be of any consequence either. The plaintiff would only be 
able to claim his actual loss in being deprived of possession of the horse. If the 
horse would have been kept in the stable, the plaintiff would receive nothing.
One may, however, be forgiven a certain degree of unease with the 
consequence that persons who infringe on the rights of others to use or freely 
dispose over their property only have to compensate actual losses and may 
keep gains which directly result from these infringements. The mere fact that 
persons whose rights were infringed did not at the time happen to be interested 
in exploiting those rights to their benefit is not a particularly convincing reason. 
As the Earl of Halsbury asked in The Mediana: “what right has a wrongdoer 
to consider what use you are going to make of your [property]?”70 For those 
67 See Midgley & Van der Walt “Delict” in LAWSA 8 (2005) para 2  Wrongfully inflicting pain and suffering 
associated with bodily injury to the plaintiff need not be considered here
68 See eg Jowell v Bramwell-Jones [2000] 2 All SA 161 (A) para 22 (“The element of damage or loss is 
fundamental to the Aquilian action and the right of action is incomplete until damage is caused to the 
plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s wrongful conduct (see Oslo Land Co Ltd v The Union Government 
1938 AD 584 at 590; Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 (2) SA 814 SA (A) at 838H–839C) … Whether 
a plaintiff has suffered damage or not is a fact which, like any other element of his cause of action and 
subject to what is said below, must be established on a balance of probabilities  Once the damage or loss 
is established a court will do its best to quantify that loss even if this involves a degree of guesswork (see 
Turkstra Ltd v Richards 1926 TPD 276 at 282–283)”)
69 Visser & Potgieter assisted by Steynberg & Floyd Visser & Potgieter’s Law of Damages 2 ed (2003) 65
70 [1900] AC 113 (HL) 117
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who find this criticism persuasive, the challenge is either to develop the law of 
delict to accommodate these cases or to seek relief elsewhere.
As far as developing the law of delict is concerned, the possibilities do not 
look promising. First, despite some earlier case law to the contrary, there is no 
enthusiasm for awarding the plaintiff an amount in excess of actual loss in the 
form of “exemplary” or “punitive” damages.71 Secondly, there are no obvious 
links to the claim for non-patrimonial loss in the context of iniuria, given that 
these claims are so strongly aimed at providing satisfaction.72 Thirdly, little 
can be gained from resorting to the notion (derived from English law) that 
“nominal damages”73 can be awarded to “vindicate a right”, even if there is 
no actual loss.74 Although the plaintiff can then obtain an order for costs in his 
favour, the amounts awarded as nominal damages are generally insignificant, 
and hardly enable the plaintiff to lay claim to the defendant’s enrichment. It 
is in any event doubtful to what extent South African law still recognises this 
form of relief.75 Even if the remedy of nominal damages could be expanded 
to allow the plaintiff to vindicate his right through being awarded the actual 
enrichment of the defendant, this would only be a covert tool, indirectly aimed 
at attacking the mischief of enrichment by wrongful taking. Fourthly, there 
is the road of possible extension of the disparate group of statutory claims for 
“damages” due to the infringement of a variety of rights, irrespective of proof 
of a loss.76 But this is hardly a satisfactory solution to a general problem.
Finally, there is the possibility of expanding the concept of patrimonial 
damages. Attempts at doing so have not been very convincing,77 since they 
lead to a world of fiction, where the loss is supposedly one of an opportunity 
to bargain and is determined by hypothetical agreements between the parties 
to pay for the use of that which has been taken – this despite the fact that 
no bargains would actually have been concluded.78 A famous case involved 
71 See Visser & Potgieter Damages 174-175, especially n 92  The influence of English law in this context is 
strong
72 Whittaker v Roos & Bateman; Morant v Roos & Bateman 1912 AD 92 123
73 See Visser & Potgieter Damages 179-181, especially authority cited in n 112  
74 See Jansen v Pienaar 1880 SC 276 277
75 According to Visser & Potgieter Damages 178:
   “It is probably correct to argue that nominal damages have no place in our law, but until the 
Appellate Division finally confirms this view, it cannot be concluded that nominal damages have 
finally disappeared”.
 See also First National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Budree 1996 1 SA 971 (N) 980  Reference to nominal 
damages is, however, occasionally made in discussions of foreign law (see eg the judgement of Ackermann 
J in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) paras 30, 64)
76 Visser & Potgieter Damages 178 n 122  See eg s 10(a) of the Performers’ Protection Act 11 of 1967, which 
holds a person who infringes the rights of a performer liable for a certain maximum amount, s 47(1) of the 
Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 15 of 1976, which awards compensation of up to R10000 for the infringement 
of a plant breeder’s rights, and s 21(b)(i) of the Heraldry Act 18 of 1962, which recognises a claim for 
damages up to the amount of R1000 for the misuse of registered heraldic representations, names, special 
names or uniforms  None of these provisions require proof of actual damages
77 Cf the criticism of Sharpe & Waddams “Damages for Lost Opportunity to Bargain” 1982 OJLS 290 in 
Linssen 2006 ERPL 354
78 Linssen 2006 ERPL 351 353 sq; especially the discussion of Penarth Dock Engineering Company Ltd v 
Pounds; Ministry of Defence v Ashmann, Attorney General v Blake and Strand Electric and Engineering 
Co Ltd v Brisford Entertainments Ltd 1952 2 QB 246
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Princess Caroline of Monaco.79 A publisher printed a fabricated interview 
supposedly conducted with the Princess, who then succeeded in claiming 
damages, even though there were no indications that she suffered any loss. 
In quantifying the damages, the publisher’s gains were taken into account. 
German academic comment suggests that this so-called damages claim in 
reality masks a claim based on unjustified enrichment.80 In English law, in 
turn, the comments by Lord Steyn in Surrey CC v Bredero Homes Ltd81 on 
Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd82 are instructive. In the 
latter case, the defendants built houses in breach of a restrictive covenant in 
favour of the plaintiffs, without it being apparent that they suffered any loss 
as a consequence of such breach. The plaintiffs were then awarded an amount 
in lieu of injunctions they sought to have the houses demolished. According 
to Lord Steyn
“The plaintiff’s argument that the Wrotham Park case can be justified on the basis of a loss of a 
bargaining opportunity is a fiction. The object of an award in the Wrotham Park case was not to 
compensate the plaintiffs for financial injury, but to deprive the defendants of an unjustly acquired 
gain”.83
Thus, the prospects for developing the law of delict to accommodate 
situations of wrongful taking from another without proof of actual patrimonial 
loss are not particularly promising. Granted, the possibility of such a 
development cannot be ruled out altogether, especially if it is felt that this 
branch of law is more established than enrichment law, and could provide 
greater flexibility in dealing with these situations. However, irrespective of 
how flexibly the concept of loss is treated in the course of such a development, 
there are some situations involving enrichment by taking where the law of 
delict would in any event not be able to provide assistance, especially not by 
way of the Aquilian action. These are situations where the plaintiff would not 
be able to meet all the requirements for a delictual claim, especially fault.84 
Thus, if the person who took the horse for a ride honestly believed that he was 
entitled to do so, the plaintiff’s delictual claim could fail due to the absence 
of fault. Furthermore, if a delictual claim for damages were to be awarded 
in the “taking” cases, the defendant would not be able to raise a defence that 
79 BGH 15 11 1994, BGHZ 128, 1 (for English extracts see Beatson & Schrage Unjustified Enrichment 555-
556)
80 See Beatson & Schrage Unjustified Enrichment 547-548; Schlechtriem “Anmerkung zu BGH Urteil von 
15 11 1994” 1996 JZ 362 (extract translated in Beatson & Schrage Unjustified Enrichment 555-556); also 
see Schlechtriem “Privacy, Publicity and Restitution of Wrongful Gains: Another New Economy?” 2001 
Oxford U Comparative L Forum 3 criticising BGH 14 2 1958 (the “Herrenreiter” case), BGHZ 26, 349 
353  
81 [1993] 1 WLR 1361 1369
82 [1974] 1 WLR 798 Ch D
83 [1993] 1 WLR 1361 1369
84 See Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment 48  The major debate among common lawyers about the extent 
to which a “wrong” (as opposed to unjust enrichment) could trigger a duty to make restitution goes 
beyond the question whether the plaintiff should prove loss or impoverishment, and cannot be canvassed 
here  It does appear, though, that once it is accepted that enrichment claims do not require proof of 
impoverishment, most of the cases where a “wrong” is said to be the cause of action could be regarded 
as cases involving unjust enrichment (see Krebs “Eingriffskondiktion und Restitution for Wrongs im 
englischen Recht” in Zimmermann (ed) Grundstrukturen eines Europäischen Bereicherungsrechts 
(2005) 163 172-173; Burrows The Law of Restitution (2002) 461)
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the enrichment has been lost. Thus, if the defendant in good faith spent the 
proceeds from the use of the horse, he would still be liable. Both these problem 
situations can be adequately accommodated within the law of unjustified 
enrichment: it does not require proof of fault on the side of the defendant, 
and it protects the party who has lost enrichment in good faith. Ultimately, 
it therefore appears worthwhile investigating whether the law of unjustified 
enrichment would not be a more appropriate or alternative source of relief in 
situations of enrichment by taking.
5 3  enrichment claims in cases of “taking” without actual 
impoverishment
The law of unjustified enrichment could respond in at least two ways to 
the challenge of providing adequate relief in the situation where enrichment 
is taken from another, but the plaintiff suffers no loss or impoverishment.85 
These ways are either expanding the impoverishment requirement or relaxing 
it.
5 3 1  Expanding the impoverishment requirement
The first possibility is to require impoverishment on the side of the plaintiff, 
but to interpret the concept broadly. In an extensive comment on the example of 
the horse taken without permission, McInnes argues that the fictional plaintiff 
indeed suffered a “loss”. This term is then defined broadly, to include a loss 
of dominium, in the sense that the owner was deprived of the ability to realise 
the financial potential inherent in the asset.86 Thus, to him it is irrelevant 
whether the owner actually intended to hire out the horse at all. It suffices that 
the owner was deprived of the opportunity of possibly renting out the horse. 
Adapted to the South African context, the argument is then essentially that 
impoverishment can also take the form of potentially depriving the owner of 
the ability to realise the asset’s inherent economic potential.
The benefit of following this broad approach is that it is not too disruptive: 
South African law could can still generally require impoverishment, and give 
effect to the justifications for this requirement. For purposes of the justification 
that the plaintiff must be impoverished before an imbalance exists which has to 
be rectified in the interests of corrective justice, the concept of impoverishment 
would just be given a broader meaning.87 A similar argument could apply to 
the justification that proof of impoverishment is essential because it shows 
that the defendant was enriched at the expense of the plaintiff.88
85 It is assumed here that the “without legal ground” or sine causa requirement is met  Thus, if property 
law accords a person some limited use of another’s unutilised property in situations of distress or need, 
an enrichment claim should be refused on the ground that the sine causa requirement is not met  The 
politically highly sensitive issue of squatting rights therefore primarily needs to be resolved through 
specific rules of property law which determine in what exceptional circumstances use of another’s land 
does not involve an unlawful taking that gives rise to an enrichment claim
86 “Hambly v Trott and the Claimant’s Expense: Professor Birks’ Challenge” in Degeling & Edelman (eds) 
Unjust Enrichment in Commercial Law (2008) 118 sqq
87 See 2 1 above
88 See 2 2 above
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The difficulty with such an approach, though, is that it is somewhat artificial.89 
When the horse is used without the owner’s authority, the owner’s rights are 
indeed violated. But to speak of a loss or, for that matter, impoverishment, 
when it is certain that the violation would never have had any patrimonial 
consequences, reaches beyond the established boundaries of these concepts. 
McInnes effectively equates the violation of a right to a loss. This confuses 
cause and effect, for, while the violation of a right could result in a loss, it does 
not do so automatically. If the horse is taken without permission, the owner’s 
rights of use and possession are indeed violated. But if the owner cannot show 
that these violations have somehow negatively influenced his patrimony (for 
example, if he would have rented out the horse to a third party), there cannot 
be a loss in any normal sense of the word. It further does not help to beg the 
question by arguing that such an extended interpretation is necessary to ensure 
that reparation is provided.90 Such an argument does not take into account the 
possibility that the violation of the right itself could be sufficient to warrant 
providing reparation. If this is the case, an extended interpretation of loss or 
impoverishment is unnecessary.
5 3 2  Relaxing the impoverishment requirement
This brings us to the second possible route whereby enrichment liability 
can be imposed in cases of enrichment by taking where there is no actual 
impoverishment. In essence, it involves accepting that the impoverishment 
requirement should be relaxed in these circumstances. To evaluate the merits 
of following this route, it is worth returning to the two justifications for 
requiring proof of impoverishment by the plaintiff. It will be recalled that 
the first of these justifications was that the purpose of the law of unjustified 
enrichment is to “correct” or “balance out” imbalances.91 It was then said that 
for an imbalance to exist the defendant must be enriched and the plaintiff must 
be impoverished. However, as Barker has observed,
“it may still be possible to justify a restitutionary response by reference to corrective justice, even 
when the plaintiff has suffered no loss by virtue of the defendant’s wrong. On this view, ‘correcting’ 
wrongs can mean stripping defendants of the profits which they make via the infringement of 
a plaintiff’s right, even where the infringement has caused the latter no harm and even where the 
consequence is to enhance the plaintiff’s prior economic position. ‘Correcting’ the imbalance which 
occurs by virtue of the defendant’s infringement is part and parcel of the desire to fully protect the 
plaintiff’s enjoyment of a right”.92
Adapted to the South African context, the point is essentially that there 
is no reason why the plaintiff must be impoverished before the defendant’s 
enrichment has to be balanced out in the interests of corrective justice. If only 
detriment of an actual patrimonial nature is regarded as worthy of correction, 
the enriched defendant may violate the rights of others with impunity, and 
89 See Hogg Obligations 2 ed (2006) para 4 33
90 McInnes “Hambly v Trott” in Unjust Enrichment in Commercial Law 118-119
91 See 2 1 above
92 Barker “Unjust Enrichment” 1995 OJLS 457; also see Weinrib “Restitutionary Damages as Corrective 
Justice” 2000 (1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 1; but see Gordley “The Purpose of Awarding Restitutionary 
Damages: A Reply to Professor Weinrib” 2000 (1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 39
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then (rather cynically) point to the lack of loss as reason for the absence of 
any imbalance. Why a violation itself does not deserve correction, but only a 
violation reflected in a loss, is simply not clear.
This brings us to the second justification for requiring impoverishment on 
the side of the plaintiff, namely the need to give effect to the “at the expense 
of” requirement.93 Again, the logic of the justification does not withstand 
scrutiny. The fact that the plaintiff suffered loss or impoverishment may 
indeed be useful in proving that the defendant has been enriched at the 
plaintiff’s expense, since it helps identifying causally connected plaintiffs: if 
it was not the plaintiff who was impoverished, but another party, the lack of 
impoverishment on the side of the plaintiff helps shows that the enrichment 
was not at his expense, but at the expense of another.94 But this does not mean 
that the causal link can only be established by proof of impoverishment. No 
violence will be done to the words “at the expense of another” if they were to 
be interpreted to cover the situation where enrichment arose from “taking” 
from another or infringing on their specific rights. Thus, it can simply be said 
that the defendant who gained from taking the horse without permission was 
enriched at the owner’s expense by infringing on his right of use. The “at 
the expense of” requirement then still fulfils its crucial function of ensuring 
proof of causality, namely that a specific plaintiff (the person whose rights 
were infringed upon), could lay claim to the enrichment in the hands of the 
defendant (the one whose enrichment arose from the infringement of that 
right). Ultimately, through proper application of this requirement, the South 
African law of unjustified enrichment would still be able to keep liability in 
acceptable bounds, even if it were to abolish the impoverishment requirement 
to accommodate the “taking” cases.95
It is understandable that there may be some concern that relaxing the 
impoverishment requirement in cases of enrichment by “taking” would 
lead South African law into unchartered waters. However, there is nothing 
particularly novel about this approach. This is illustrated by the German 
experience, which for some time now has allowed an enrichment claim based 
on taking (the Eingriffskondiktion), without specifically requiring proof of 
impoverishment. The crucial question is whether the defendant was enriched 
by infringing or encroaching on a right where the gains to be derived from 
this right were solely allocated or assigned to the plaintiff (for example where 
93 See 2 2 above
94 It was therefore not necessary to reconfirm the impoverishment requirement in Firstrand Bank Ltd v 
Nedbank (Swaziland) 2004 6 SA 317 (SCA)  The court could simply have found that identifying the 
impoverished party assisted in establishing at whose expense the defendant was enriched  Impoverishment 
could then serve as means of proof that the “at the expense of” requirement was met, and need not have 
been regarded as a separate requirement
95 It is therefore not necessary to relax the “at the expense of” requirement as Blackie and Farlam suggest 
(“Enrichment by the Act of the Party Enriched” in Mixed Legal Systems 496-497)  The “at the expense of” 
requirement must be retained to ensure that there is a causal link between the plaintiff and the defendant’s 
enrichment  It would perhaps have been preferable to state that the “at the expense of” requirement should 
be reinterpreted so that it also covers situations where there is no impoverishment  
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there is infringement on an owner’s right of use).96 It is this infringement 
which constitutes the imbalance, and which indicates that the enrichment of 
the defendant was at the expense of the plaintiff.97
The German experience has not, however, been entirely free of difficulties. 
As indicated earlier, the relationship between claims based on enrichment 
by taking and delictual claims for damages remains unclear. Thus, in the 
Princess of Caroline of Monaco case,98 there undoubtedly was enrichment as 
a result of an encroachment on a personality right which only she was entitled 
to exploit.99 Yet, the court awarded compensation or damages. One possible 
explanation is that the court may have regarded it as too difficult to quantify 
an enrichment claim, which would require determining the profit derived by 
the publication concerned.100 Although this issue does not affect the question 
whether an enrichment claim should be allowed in principle, it is therefore 
important to be clear about how such a claim will be awarded in practice. 
South African law will no doubt face similar difficulties, and it is then to this 
matter which we will now turn.
5 3 3  Quantifying enrichment liability when the plaintiff is not 
impoverished
If South African law were indeed to award enrichment claims in cases 
of “taking” without proof of impoverishment by the plaintiff, these claims 
could not be quantified with the “double ceiling” rule. The logic is simple. If 
there is no impoverishment, the measure, being the lesser of the plaintiff’s 
impoverishment and the defendant’s enrichment, would then always be 
zero. The focus in the “taking” cases will therefore inevitably be on the 
defendant’s enrichment, and the challenge is to determine how much of it 
must be surrendered. This question has received considerable attention in 
comparative literature, and cannot be examined in detail here.101 The purpose 
of this section is simply to indicate that there are no insurmountable obstacles 
in the way of such quantification.
Courts regularly exercise discretionary powers in determining the 
measure of a variety of remedies. The use of such powers is, for example, 
well-established in cases where a person in possession of another’s property 
96 This is according to the Zuweisungstheorie (“attribution theory”), which maintains that not all gains 
which result from encroaching on a right gives rise to an enrichment claim: rights are said to have a 
certain “allocation” or “attribution” content or potential (Zuweisungsgehalt), and it is only if the legal 
order exclusively “attributes” or “allocates” the gain to the holder of the right that he is awarded an 
enrichment claim  The theory originates from Wilburg and was developed by von Caemmerer (see 
Schlechtriem Restitution und Bereicherungsausgleich 2 ch 6 para 12 (90); Visser Unjustified Enrichment 
128-129, 680; Wieling Bereicherungsrecht 47; Birks “Direct and Indirect Enrichment in English Law” 
in Johnston & Zimmermann (eds) Unjustified Enrichment – Key Issues in Comparative Perspective 493 
511
97 See Beatson & Schrage Unjustified Enrichment 184-185, and the discussion there of BGH, 9 March 1989, 
BGHZ 107, 117 (extract translated at 190-192)  
98 BGH 15 11 1994, BGHZ 128, 1
99 See Zimmermann “Bereicherungsrecht in Europa: Eine Einführung” in Zimmermann (ed) 
Grundstrukturen eines Europäischen bereicherungsrechts 17 39 esp n 130
100 See Schlechtriem “Anmerkung zu BGH Urteil von 15 11 1995” 1996 JZ 362 (extract translated in Beatson 
& Schrage Unjustified Enrichment 555-556)
101 See eg Schlechtriem Restitution und Bereicherungsausgleich 2 ch 6 paras 330 sqq  
512 STELL LR 2009 3
       
imposes enrichment through preserving or improving it. In these cases the 
courts ultimately can determine an amount which is fair and equitable under 
the circumstances.102 In the context of enrichment by taking, and especially 
by use, it is also desirable to resort to such a flexible approach.103 However, 
as the experience of other systems shows, certain general measures can guide 
the exercise of these discretions. Of these measures, the following have been 
particularly prominent.
The first measure is that of the objectively-determined, reasonable “licence 
fee” the defendant would have to pay the plaintiff if he properly requested 
consent.104 In the case of the horse which is used without permission, the 
enrichment of the defendant can then be quantified as the rental he would have 
had to pay for the horse, ie the amount by which his estate would otherwise have 
decreased. Measuring enrichment by way of such an objective approach is not 
unfamiliar in South African law. Reference has been made to paying rental in 
cases of enrichment by use of another’s corporeal property,105 and statutory 
claims for payment of licence fees are recognised in situations of unauthorised 
taking through infringing on intellectual property rights.106 When applying 
this objective test to measuring enrichment, it does not matter whether the 
particular defendant made a profit by taking or not. And neither does it matter 
that the plaintiff was even better off as a consequence of the taking. Plaintiffs 
should generally be prevented from laying claim to enrichments which are too 
remote or causally irrelevant.107
However, in certain circumstances it may not be appropriate to use 
the objective measure. Some systems then demand that the person who is 
enriched by taking should surrender the actual profits earned as a consequence 
of the taking.108 It is not easy to discern when precisely use is made of this 
measure,109 but it does seem as if it is especially the person who flagrantly 
or cynically infringes on another’s rights who should disgorge his profits. In 
this regard, copyright law provides an interesting statutory parallel: whereas 
the owner normally can lay claim to a reasonable royalty which would have 
102 See ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Bankfin v Stander t/a CAW Paneelkloppers 1998 1 SA 939 (C) 957l; Fletcher and 
Fletcher v Bulawayo Waterworks Co Ltd; Bulawayo Waterworks Co Ltd v Fletcher and Fletcher 1915 AD 
636, 648, 656-657; Wynland Construction (Pty) Ltd v Ashley-Smith 1985 1 SA 534 (C) 538
103 See the references to a reasonable or fair amount in Lobo Properties (Pty) Ltd v Express Lift Co (SA) (Pty) 
(Ltd) 1961 1 SA 704 (C) 708-710; Blackie & Farlam “Enrichment by the Act of the Party Enriched” in 
Mixed Legal Systems 478
104 See Linssen 2006 ERPL 353-360; Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment 47-51  
105 See Lobo Properties (Pty) Ltd v Express Lift Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1961 1 SA 704 (C) 708-710; Rubin v Botha 
1911 AD 568; Blackie & Farlam “Enrichment by the Act of the Party Enriched” in Mixed Legal Systems 
478, 486  Cases where there is enrichment by “taking” through original acquisition of ownership (as 
opposed to use), but without impoverishment, are rare  De Villiers v Van Zyl 1880 Foord 77 may serve as 
an example  The defendants knew that plaintiff intended to capture and domesticate some birds which 
had been hatched on the plaintiff’s land  The defendants then drove the birds from the plaintiff’s land, and 
caught and kept the birds  The plaintiff was then awarded the value of the birds  Although the claim was 
formulated in delict, there probably was no actual loss, since the plaintiff could never have been owner of 
the birds without capturing and maintaining sufficient control over them  The case is better explained in 
terms of a duty to surrender unjustified enrichment arising from “taking” through original acquisition of 
ownership
106 See eg s 24(1A) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978
107 On the extent to which this principle also underlies the “double ceiling” rule, see 3 2 above
108 See Linssen 2006 ERPL 358-360; 361-362  
109 Schlechtriem Restitution und Bereicherungsausgleich 2 335 sqq
THE RELEVANCE OF THE PLAINTIFF’S IMPOVERISHMENT 513
       
been payable by a licensee in respect of the work concerned,110 the owner can 
claim an additional amount in cases of flagrant infringement of copyright. In 
calculating these “damages”, the defendant’s actual enrichment is then taken 
into account.111
6  The appropriate action with which to lay claim to enrichment 
when the plaintiff has not been impoverished
It has been argued above that it is justifiable in certain circumstances to 
impose enrichment liability in the absence of proof of actual loss on the side 
of the plaintiff. It does not fall within the ambit of this article to identify the 
appropriate enrichment claims which could be applied in these circumstances, 
and the following brief remarks will have to suffice.
In principle, there can be no objection to continue resorting to an existing 
action if the situation would otherwise have been dealt with in terms of that 
action. Thus, if the plaintiff made an undue payment, but subsequently passed 
on the impoverishment,112 the condictio indebiti should still be the appropriate 
action. To allow a general action in these circumstances, and let it operate 
in tandem with the condictio indebiti, creates the risk of inconsistency: for 
example, to require proof of excusable mistake from the plaintiff who has not 
passed on the impoverishment and claims with the condictio indebiti, but not 
to require such proof from the plaintiff who has benefitted from passing on is 
irrational and indefensible.
However, in cases of enrichment by taking or infringing on another’s 
rights, latching on to the existing actions may not be a fruitful exercise.113 
Cases of enrichment by use have thus far not enjoyed much attention, 
and the appropriate claim is in any event unsure.114 In these situations it 
is therefore worth seriously considering applying the general enrichment 
action, as foreshadowed in McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers 
CC.115
7  Conclusions
The question whether the plaintiff has been impoverished has gradually 
and subtly assumed a position of great prominence in the South African 
law of unjustified enrichment. Proof of impoverishment, defined in terms 
of actual detrimental effects on the plaintiff’s patrimony, is said to be a 
110 S 24(1A) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978  
111 S 24(3); on this provision further see Metro Goldwyn-Mayer Incorporated v Ackerman [1996] 1 All SA 
584 (SE); Visser Unjustified Enrichment 689-690
112 See 4 above
113 Historically, the condictio sine causa specialis is awarded in cases where a person is enriched as a result 
of disposing over or consuming another’s property, but this has always been rather odd, given that the 
condictiones generally apply to cases where enrichment is given without legal ground
114 See Hefer v Van Greuning 1979 4 SA 952 (A) 959, where the possibility is raised of “an enrichment 
action” being available in the case of enrichment as a result of use; reference is then made to De Vos 
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in die Suid Afrikaanse Reg 2 ed (1971) 229 sq, which in turn refers to a 
variety of actions that could fulfil such a function
115 2001 3 SA 482 (SCA)  See Visser “The Potential Role of a General Enrichment Action” 2009 Stell LR 
373  
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general requirement for all enrichment claims. Impoverishment is further of 
central importance when determining the measure of enrichment liability: 
according to the “double ceiling” rule the measure of an enrichment claim 
is limited to the lesser of the plaintiff’s impoverishment and the defendant’s 
enrichment.
However, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the justifications 
for according impoverishment such a prominent position. Upon closer 
investigation, these justifications are rather weak. It is not apparent why 
the plaintiff must be impoverished for the defendant’s enrichment to be 
“balanced out” in the interest of “corrective justice”, or why the plaintiff must 
be impoverished for the defendant’s enrichment to be at the expense of the 
plaintiff. This weakness is particularly pronounced in cases of enrichment 
by taking or infringing on another person’s rights. For example, where 
the defendant is enriched by unauthorised use of the plaintiff’s property, 
the infringement on the plaintiff’s rights itself points to an imbalance 
that needs to be corrected. The infringement may often result in a loss or 
impoverishment, but does not have to do so. A similar objection can be 
raised against the justification that proof of impoverishment is essential to 
meet the requirement that enrichment was at the plaintiff’s expense. By 
showing that he holds the right, and that it is the infringement on this right 
which resulted in the defendant’s enrichment, the plaintiff can establish the 
necessary causal link which shows that the defendant’s enrichment was at 
his expense. Again, such an infringement may, but does not have to result in 
a loss or impoverishment.
Rejecting the impoverishment requirement does not give rise to 
insurmountable problems of quantification. The “double ceiling” rule would 
by definition not apply if there is no impoverishment. However, its underlying 
justification, namely to prevent the plaintiff from claiming causally irrelevant 
enrichment, is still important. As the experiences of some other jurisdictions 
show, an objective, market-related standard is usually adequate to measure 
the value of the defendant’s enrichment. Enrichment which exceeds this 
measure would then be causally irrelevant, especially if it is the product of the 
defendant’s industry. However, there are exceptional cases that the defendant 
(especially one who cynically violated the plaintiff’s rights) should have to 
surrender his actual profits.
Although there are alternative approaches to dealing with the situation 
where a defendant is enriched by taking from the plaintiff, but without the 
plaintiff suffering a loss or impoverishment, these approaches do not look 
particularly promising. Attempts at remaining loyal to the impoverishment 
requirement, but defining it more broadly to cover situations which do 
not have any patrimonial consequences are rather artificial. If there is no 
loss, it is also not convincing to accommodate situations of enrichment by 
“taking” within the law of delict, and the Aquilian action in particular. More 
violence would be done to the law of delict by not requiring proof of loss, 
than would be done to the law of unjustified enrichment by not requiring 
proof of impoverishment.
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SUMMARY
The question whether the plaintiff has been impoverished is of central importance in the South 
African law of unjustified enrichment. Proof of impoverishment is a general requirement for 
enrichment claims, and according to the “double ceiling” rule, the measure of the claim is limited 
to the lesser of the plaintiff’s impoverishment and the defendant’s enrichment. It is argued that the 
justifications for according impoverishment such a prominent position are not strong, and that the 
impoverishment requirement must be relaxed in certain circumstances – most notably where the 
defendant is enriched through “taking” or infringing on the plaintiff’s rights. The impossibility of 
applying the “double ceiling” rule in these circumstances does not present any major difficulties. As 
the experiences of other jurisdictions show, there are alternative tests that can provide levels of relief 
which adequately balance the interests of the parties.
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